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Abstract
We study cheating strategies against a practical four-state quantum bit-commitment protocol
[A. Danan and L. Vaidman, Quant. Info. Proc. 11, 769 (2012)] and its two-state variant [R.
Loura et al., Phys. Rev. A 89, 052336 (2014)] when the underlying quantum channels are
noisy and the cheating party is constrained to using single-qubit measurements only. We show
that simply inferring the transmitted photons’ states by using the Breidbart basis, optimal for
ambiguous (minimum-error) state discrimination, does not directly produce an optimal cheating
strategy for this bit-commitment protocol. We introduce a strategy, based on certain post-
measurement processes, and show it to have better chances at cheating than the direct approach.
We also study to what extent sending forged geographical coordinates helps a dishonest party
in breaking the binding security requirement. Finally, we investigate the impact of imperfect
single-photon sources in the protocols. Our study shows that, in terms of the resources used, the
four-state protocol is advantageous over the two-state version. The analysis performed can be
straightforwardly generalised to any finite-qubit measurement, with the same qualitative results.
1 Introduction
With the accelerating development of quantum information theory, new cryptographic protocols
and primitives arise every day alongside new engineering techniques to turn them into reality.
Naturally, due to the resemblance to classical cryptography and its implementations, new challenges
and new difficulties appear once one moves from theory to practice. Quantifying the impact of these
difficulties and studying their solutions is thus of utmost importance if quantum cryptography is to
become a widespread reality. As a step towards this goal, we here study the feasibility of several
different attacks on a practical two-state quantum bit-commitment (BC) protocol [10, 1, 2] and
its original four-state variant [4] in a noisy environment. By practical, we mean that cheating is
subjected to current technological constraints: the lack of long-term quantum memories and, in the
case of the currently predominant optical realisations, the non-existence of photon non-demolition
measurements. Thus, an agent (in our case Alice) is forced to perform measurements as soon as (s)he
receives the qubits encoded in, say, photon polarisation. Various practical cryptographic protocols
based on bounded and/or noisy memories have been studied [16, 13, 7, 12], in order to avoid the
Lo-Chau [9] and Mayers [11] no-go theorem regarding non-relativistic implementations of quantum
∗npaunkov@math.tecnico.ulisboa.pt
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bit-commitment schemes. (see also a recent proposal of a computationally secure oblivious transfer
protocol [15]).
We start by reviewing the protocol’s steps, including a careful definition of the verification
procedure, in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss the so-called cheating observable, given by the
Breidbart basis, and show that the na¨ıve approach, studied in [10], can be perfected. In Section 4,
we analyse the so-called faking-distance attack, based on providing wrong geographical information
to the verifier. Finally, Section 5 is dedicated to the so-called beam-splitter attack, which takes
advantage of the fact that no perfect single-photon sources exist, much to the resemblance of
BB84’s photon-number splitting attack. We compare the enhanced attack with its counterpart
in the four-state variant.
2 The protocol
Commitment protocols, initially proposed in 1981 by Manuel Blum [3] and simultaneously by
Shamir, Rivest and Adleman [14], are important current cryptographic primitives that serve as
building blocks for several cryptographic and computational protocols, such as zero-knowledge
proofs [5] and multi-party computation [8]. Simply put, a commitment scheme is a sequence of
steps between a prover (Alice) and a verifier (Bob) that allows them to essentially roll a dice in a
fair way over a communication channel. In the first step (the commitment phase), Alice makes a
choice from a set of possible choices (1, . . . , n in the case of an actual n-sided dice). In the second
step (the revealing phase), Bob asks Alice to reveal her choice and to prove that it was indeed her
initial choice. In practice, these two steps are not done immediately after one another, but are
instead crucial parts of a larger protocol. Naturally, the scheme must guarantee that between the
two phases Alice cannot change her mind (called the binding requirement), and that Bob cannot
learn Alice’s commitment choice before she reveals it (called the concealing requirement). For a
more detailed description and examples of commitment schemes, see [10]. If Alice’s choice is bound
to be either 0 or 1, then we say that the commitment scheme is a bit-commitment scheme. Fur-
thermore, if the protocol requires quantum communication of any kind, we say that it is a quantum
commitment scheme.
In this work we are interested in a particular quantum bit commitment scheme initially presented
in [10], building on the earlier works of Danan and Vaidman in [4]. We begin with a brief review
of the protocol’s definition. A detailed version of what follows, along with a theoretical security
analysis, can be found in [10] and in [2]. Note, however, that in the present paper we use a slightly
different notation. In fact, the works [10] and [2] focus exclusively on the two-state protocol, whereas
we here aim at studying both the two-state and the four-state protocol variants. Since the original
notations of each of these are incompatible, we opt here for the standard quantum computation
convention, recalled below.
The two-state protocol goes as follows (the analogous four-state protocol is presented in Sec-
tion 3.2):
1. Alice and Bob agree on a computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}, and, as usual, on the vectors |+〉 =
1/
√
2(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉).
2. Bob randomly chooses one of the two states |0〉 or |+〉, then prepares and sends a particle in
that state to Alice. He repeats this step a number M of times of his choice.
3. Alice either measures Cˆ0, for committing to 0, on all the particles she receives, or she measures
Cˆ1, for committing to 1, on all the particles she receives, where Cˆ0 and Cˆ1 are the observables
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defined by
Cˆ0 = 0 · |0〉〈0|+ 1 · |1〉〈1|
Cˆ1 = 0 · |+〉〈+|+ 1 · |−〉〈−|.
(1)
4. Whenever Alice wants to reveal her commitment, she sends her commitment choice and the
results of her measurements back to Bob.
5. Bob either accepts or discards Alice’s commitment, based on some statistical criterion of his
choosing.
Since the states sent by Bob are non-orthogonal, the outcomes of Alice’s measurements follow
different probability distributions, according to whether Cˆ0 or Cˆ1 was the chosen observable. Indeed,
if we denote by pi(j|k) the probability that Alice measures the value j with the observable Cˆi
whenever Bob sends a particle in state |k〉, we have
p0(0|0) = 1
p0(1|0) = 0
p0(0|+) = 1
2
p0(1|+) = 1
2
,
(2)
and, similarly,
p1(0|0) = 1
2
p1(1|0) = 1
2
p1(0|+) = 0
p1(1|+) = 1.
(3)
Choosing either observable Cˆ0 or observable Cˆ1 thus has a clear impact on Alice’s set of measure-
ment outcomes or, in other words, her sets of statistical data, her statistical signature. Consequently,
once Alice reveals her results, Bob can know whether she used observable Cˆ0 or observable Cˆ1 (see
below). Evidently, measuring any other observable, or different observables on each photon, will
destroy the statistical signature. By exactly how much, and whether or not Alice can take any kind
of advantage out of it, is the topic of the next section.
Unfortunately, things are not as simple in any real-world implementation of the protocol, where
any emission, transmission and measurement processes are inevitably subject to a certain amount
of white noise. To account for such imperfections during the course of the protocol, we model
the white noise as a depolarizing channel, or r-noise channel, Ed, such that with probability r the
state becomes totally mixed, while with probability (1 − r) it remains unharmed. It can thus be
represented as a super-operator acting on a state ρ by
Ed(ρ) = (1− r)ρ+ r I
2
. (4)
As expected, such a channel affects the sets of probabilities (2) and (3), which now become
functions of r. We abuse notation and refer to the new set of probabilities by the same symbols, as
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the former will not be of use henceforth. We have
p0(0|0) = 1− r
2
p0(1|0) = r
2
p0(0|+) = 1
2
p0(1|+) = 1
2
,
(5)
and
p1(0|0) = 1
2
p1(1|0) = 1
2
p1(0|+) = r
2
p1(1|+) = 1− r
2
.
(6)
Finally, we need to formulate a systematic way for Bob to accept or discard Alice’s commitment.
Once Alice reveals her commitment and her measurement results, Bob’s goal is to determine whether
her statistics follow the probability distribution defined by (5), the one defined by (6), or neither
of these two. This problem, of deciding whether or not a sample comes from a given distribution,
is an extremely well-known problem in statistics, and can be solved through a variety of methods,
jointly called goodness-of-fit tests, the most famous of which is likely to be the chi-squared test. We
here, however, take advantage of the simplicity of our particular case and instead use a far more
straightforward test, called the binomial test.
To do so, let us assume that Bob sends N0 particles in state |0〉. Without loss of generality,
suppose Alice measures the Cˆ0 observable on all of them, i.e., she commits to the value 0. Then
the probability P (n0 0’s) that she obtains n0 times the value 0 after measuring all the particles is
given, by definition, by a binomial distribution
P (n0 0’s) =
(
N0
n0
)
pn00 (0|0)pN0−n00 (1|0). (7)
This binomial distribution has mean value µ0 and variance σ
2
0 defined by
µ0 = N0p0(0|0)
σ20 = N0p0(0|0)(1− p0(0|0)).
(8)
The binomial test then goes as follows: Bob proceeds if Alice’s statistics satisfy
n0 ∈ [µ0 − 3σ0, µ0 + 3σ0]. (9)
Otherwise, he immediately aborts the protocol. The above condition ensures that if Alice is com-
mitting to 0, then she has ∼99.7% chance of having her first set of statistics accepted by Bob. This
value is simply
0.997 ∼
bµ0+3σ0c∑
k=dµ0−3σ0e
(
N0
k
)
pk0(0|0)pN0−k0 (1|0). (10)
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Analogously, Bob tests Alice’s statistics whenever state |+〉 is sent, and proceeds if and only if
n+ ∈ [µ+ − 3σ+, µ+ + 3σ+]. (11)
Otherwise, he immediately aborts. The probability that Alice’s commitment is accepted by Bob, i.e.
the probability that Alice passes both tests, is then simply the product of the separate probabilities.
Note, of course, that one could choose a standard deviation factor other than 3. The smaller it is,
the more restrictive the criterion becomes. For simplicity, throughout the paper we set that Bob
sends an equal number of particles in each state, i.e., N0 = N+ = N (and N0/1 = N+/− in the
four-state case), the assumption secured by the law of large numbers.
The test is, mutatis mutandis, the same if Alice were to commit to 1 instead (Fig. 1). However,
there is still a loose end: there is a nonzero probability that an Alice trying to commit to 1 produces
statistics that satisfy both (9) and (11), thus convincing Bob that she committed to 0, and making
the test nonviable. This probability decreases exponentially with the number of measurements.
Heuristically, a number of total measurements of M = 100 (about fifty 0’s measured, and fifty 1’s
measured, N = N0 = N+ = 50) is enough to guarantee viability of the protocol for any reasonable
amount of noise, as Fig. 1 shows.
Figure 1: Probability, as a function of white noise, of an honest Alice committing to 1, with M = 100
successful measurements, passing Bob’s test of commitment to 0.
3 Optimal cheating observable
The main goal of this section is to answer a simple question: Can Alice cheat? In other words, can
she devise a strategy so that she is able to convince Bob that she made a choice when in reality
she did not? Naturally, Bob could also try to break the protocol. However, he has a much tougher
job. For Bob to break the protocol, he would need to know what Alice’s choice of measurement was
before Alice makes it public. Since he has no access to Alice’s laboratory, doing so is impossible,
even if using entangled pairs, due to nonsignaling. Alice’s side of things seem much more promising.
For Alice to cheat, she has to be able to produce statistics that follow either distribution (5) or
distribution (6) upon request. Since the only thing she can do is perform measurements on the
incoming particles, she needs to find the measurement that best allows her to mimic both those
distributions, eventually after some post-processing.
Note, of course, that, in an ideal setting, Alice could simply store the incoming particles in
a quantum memory and measure them only when announcing her commitment. However, stable
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long-term quantum memories are still a long way from becoming an everyday item, and we thus
assume that Alice is forced to perform her measurements on the incoming particles as soon as they
arrive. For a more complete discussion, including the case of noisy memories, please refer to [10].
3.1 The two-state protocol
The first attempt at creating a cheating strategy is, naturally, to try and guess the state of every
photon sent by Bob. Since there is no way of perfectly and systematically distinguishing non-
orthogonal states, the best Alice can do, provided she is constrained to performing single-qubit
measurements only, is to measure an observable “in-between” Cˆ0 and Cˆ1. Finding the basis that
best discriminates states |0〉 and |+〉 is a common and well-studied problem in quantum mechanics.
Such a basis is called a Breidbart basis. Specifically, let |0˜〉 (|1˜〉) denote the vector |0〉 (|+〉) rotated
by −pi/8 (pi/8), so as to form the aforementioned Breidbart basis, and define a new observable, the
cheating observable Cˆch, by
Cˆch = 0 · |0˜〉〈0˜|+ 1 · |1˜〉〈1˜|, (12)
where
|0˜〉 = cos pi
8
|0〉 − sin pi
8
|1〉
|1˜〉 = sin pi
8
|0〉+ cos pi
8
|1〉.
(13)
Armed with this observable, Alice has a certain probability pch(a|b) of obtaining the result a when-
ever state |b〉 is sent. Concretely, in an r-noise channel, we have
pch(0|0) = r
2
+
1
4
(2 +
√
2− (2 +
√
2)r)
pch(1|0) = r
2
+
1
4
(2−
√
2− (2−
√
2)r)
pch(0|+) = 1
4
(2−
√
2 + r
√
2)
pch(1|+) = 1
4
(2 +
√
2− r
√
2).
(14)
Note that the Breidbart basis, optimal for distinguishing states |0〉 and |+〉, is also optimal for
distinguishing the mixed states obtained as a result of the action of a depolarizing channel (due to
the symmetry of white noise) as it saturates the Helstrom bound.
Once Alice has inferred the state of every photon, she can send her results back to Bob in
hopes of passing his test. Such a strategy has been considered and analysed in previous work [10].
However, she can do better. After all, Alice knows that her inference is not completely accurate,
and so sending her inference on what the states sent by Bob may be is definitely not the best she
can do. In fact, even if Alice were able to perfectly determine the state of Bob’s particles, she would
not send these results back to Bob but, rather, results that would emulate the statistics of an honest
Alice [such as (2) or (5)]. She can thus proceed as follows: every time she obtains a 0 with the
cheating observable, she decides either to change the result, with a certain probability p0→1, or to
keep it, with probability (1−p0→1). Analogously, every time Alice obtains a 1, she decides either to
change it, with probability p1→0, or to keep it, with probability (1− p1→0). After such a procedure,
denoting by pch(a|b) the probability that Alice sends the value a back to Bob whenever he sends
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|b〉, we have:
pch(0|0) = pch(0|0) · (1− p0→1) + pch(1|0) · p1→0
pch(1|0) = pch(1|0) · (1− p1→0) + pch(0|0) · p0→1
pch(0|+) = pch(0|1) · (1− p0→1) + pch(1|0) · p1→0
pch(1|+) = pch(1|1) · (1− p1→0) + pch(0|1) · p0→1.
(15)
The next step is rather straightforward: determine the values of p0→1 and p1→0 that most
increase Alice’s chances of successfully cheating. Naturally, this depends on Bob’s criterion, and
on whether Alice is trying to trick Bob into believing she committed to 0, or trying to trick him
into believing she committed to 1. Without loss of generality, assume that Alice is trying to forge
a commitment to 0, and that Bob is using the goodness-of-fit test described in Section 2, that is,
he accepts Alice’s commitment to 0 if the number of 0’s revealed by Alice falls within the interval
[µ0 − 3σ0, µ0 + 3σ0] whenever |0〉 was sent [see (9)], and the number of 1’s within the interval
[µ+−3σ+, µ+ + 3σ+] whenever |+〉 was sent [see (11)]. The probability that a cheating Alice passes
this test is then given by
pch =
 µ0+3σ0∑
k=µ0−3σ0
(
N0
k
)
pkch(0|0) · pN0−kch (1|0)
 µ++3σ+∑
k=µ+−3σ+
(
N+
k
)
pkch(0|+) · pN1−kch (1|+)
 (16)
where N0 = N+ = N are the number of |0〉 states and the number of |+〉 states sent by Bob,
respectively.
Although finding an expression for the maximum of such a function is non-trivial, it is quite
simple to do so numerically. In Fig. 2 we present a few plots of pch, for different values of the noise
parameter r, and for M = N0 +N+ = 2N = 100.
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Figure 2: Probability pch of a cheating Alice with M = N0 + N+ = 2N = 100 successful measure-
ments passing Bob’s test of commitment to 0, for different values of the noise parameter r (0 - top
left, 0.08 - top right, 0.16 - bottom left, 0.24 - bottom right).
As can be seen, to obtain an optimal cheating strategy in the case of a noiseless channel, a
cheating Alice should always choose p0→1 to be 0. For higher values of noise Alice should choose
p0→1 to be slightly higher than 0. For M = 100 the threshold value for r, for which Alice should
choose p0→1 > 0, is above 0.52, and it decreases as M grows. As for p1→0, the optimal value lies
in the interval (0.4, 0.5), but depends on the noise parameter r. Given the optimal choice of the
parameters p0→1 and p1→0, the maximal probability of cheating, pmaxch , is presented in Fig. 3, as a
function of M = N0 +N+ = 2N and r.
8
Figure 3: Probability pmaxch of a cheating Alice as a function of the number M = N0 +N+ = 2N of
successful measurements passing Bob’s test of commitment to 0, and the noise parameter r.
3.2 The four-state protocol
It is quite interesting to compare the two-state cheating strategy above with the analogous cheating
strategy for the four-state variant of the protocol. This variant, initially proposed in [4], goes as
follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on the two observables
Cˆ0 = 0 · |0〉〈0|+ 1 · |1〉〈1|
Cˆ1 = 0 · |−〉〈−|+ 1 · |+〉〈+|.
(17)
2. Bob randomly chooses one of the four states, |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 of |−〉, and then prepares and sends
a particle in that state to Alice. He repeats this step a number M of times of his choice.
3. Alice either measures Cˆ0, for committing to 0, on all the particles she receives; or measures
Cˆ1, for committing to 1, on all the particles she receives.
4. Whenever Alice wants to reveal her commitment, she sends her commitment choice along with
the results of her measurements back to Bob.
5. Bob either accepts or discards Alice’s commitment, based on some statistical criterion of his
choosing.
Instead of two tests, Alice now has to pass four distinct tests: one for whenever each different
state was sent. The four probability distributions are now given by Equations (5), (6), and two
additional but analogous ones for whenever states |1〉 and |−〉 are sent. Again, in Fig. 4 we plot
the probability that a cheating Alice, measuring all photons in the Breidbart basis (the same as for
the two-state protocol), passes all four tests of commitment to 0, as a function of the probability of
changing her mind about 0’s (p0→1) and about 1’s (p1→0), for N = N0/1 = N+/− = 50.
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Figure 4: Probability of a cheating Alice with M = N0 +N1 +N+ +N− = 200 successful measure-
ments passing Bob’s test of commitment to 0, for different values of the noise parameter r (0 - top
left, 0.08 - top right, 0.16 - bottom left, 0.24 - bottom right).
As can be seen, it is always advantageous for a cheating Alice to change her mind about both
0’s and 1’s. Finally, in Fig. 5 we show the maximal probability of cheating, pmaxch , as a function of
M = N0 +N1 +N+ +N− = 4N and r. Compared with the two-state case, it is clear that in terms
of the resources (the total number of measurement outcomes, M = 2N for two-state, and M = 4N ′
for four-state protocols, with N ′ = N/2) the four-state protocol is advantageous.
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Figure 5: Probability pmaxch of a cheating Alice as a function of the number M = 4N of successful
measurements passing Bob’s test of commitment to 0, and the noise parameter r.
4 Faking-distance attack
In any experimental implementation of the above protocols, there will be inevitable losses during
transmission, just as there is inevitable noise. These losses, just like noise, need to be taken into
account by Bob when receiving the final data from Alice. Indeed, if Alice is close by, then Bob
expects her to receive most of the emitted particles, say, photons, and thus expects a measurement
result for almost each photon sent. On the other hand, if Alice is far away, then several photons will
be lost during transmission, and thus Bob will be expecting only a small number of measurement
results compared to the number of photons sent. Curiously enough, this mundane phenomenon is
advantageous for a cheating Alice.
Suppose Alice is much closer to Bob than she claimed to be, meaning Bob is expecting that
only a fraction f of the particles sent will end up producing a measurement result. In reality, Alice
is able to generate measurement results for (almost) all emitted photons. So if Alice has a way
to produce statistical data in perfect agreement with those of two honest parties committing to
different values for a fraction f of all particles, she can trick Bob into thinking her forged statistics
are the legitimate statistics obtained by an Alice far away, who had access to only f times the
particles sent.
Alice can achieve this very easily by simply measuring Cˆ0 on half of the received particles, and
Cˆ1 on the other half. When asked to give proof of her commitment, Alice simply sends the half
of the measurement results that best suits her, thus emulating an honest Alice who would have
had access to only 50% of the particles sent. This strategy is stronger than the equally common
technique of unambiguous state discrimination, where Alice can learn the true state of around 29%
of the particles she receives.
A cheating Alice, making her measurements right outside Bob’s laboratory, while pretending
to be far away, can thus cheat if Bob is expecting that only 50% or less of the particles sent end
up producing a measurement result (by an honest Alice). There is thus a maximal distance up to
which the protocol is secure: the distance beyond which an honest Alice is able to measure only
50% or less of the particles sent. To estimate this distance, let NP be the total number of pulses
produced by Bob. In each pulse, a photon is emitted following a certain probability distribution
with mean µ. The total number of emitted photons is then NE = µNP . The number of photons
received by an honest Alice is thus NR = 10
−αL/10NE , where α is the attenuation coefficient and
L is the length of the optical fibre. Finally, due to a finite detector efficiency η, the number of
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measurement outcomes of an honest Alice is NM = ηNR = ηµ10
−αL/10NP , while for a cheating
Alice it is NcM = ηNE = ηµNP . A cheating Alice, performing measurements right outside Bob’s
laboratory (L = 0), produces statistics that are compatible with her future choice of commitment
on 50% of the measurement outcomes. Note that we are assuming that a cheating Alice has the
same type of detector as an honest Alice, since we are dealing with a practical case scenario. Thus,
the maximal distance Lmax for which the protocol is still secure is given by NM = NcM/2, leading
to
Lmax =
10
α
log10(2). (18)
For a typical value of α = 0.2 (as used in, for instance, [2]), this amounts to a maximal safe
distance of 15km.
This attack shares quite some similarity to the famous photon-number splitting attack on the
BB84 protocol, which can be patched using decoy states, as suggested by Hwang in [6]. Unfor-
tunately, this remedy is not applicable in our case, since the evildoer (Eve) and the honest agent
(Alice) are one and the same. We are thus left with only a maximum safe distance.
In the case of real-life noisy scenario, it is natural to assume that the “distant” Alice obtains
imperfect results due to the “distant” noise factor rd, while the cheating “nearby” Alice has noise
given by rn < rd. A cheating Alice therefore has better statistics than an honest one, and can use
her “good” results on 50% of the cases to infer, say, (50 + δ)% of the “less quality” results obtained
by an honest Alice: by randomly choosing δ% of the “missing” results, a cheating Alice spoils the
overall quality of her statistics, to match those of an honest Alice, which additionally decreases
Lmax. In other words, we have
NM =
NcM
2
+ ∆N, (19)
where ∆N = δ · N (consequently, δ = 1/2 − 10−αL/10). The statistics pc;rd(∗|∗), with c ∈ {0, 1},
of an honest Alice are given by Equations (5) and (6), with r = rd. The statistics of a cheating
Alice are given by a weighted sum of the “good” results, measured on NcM/2 photons, and random
guesses, presented for ∆N photons:
pchc;rn(∗|∗) =
NcM
2
NcM
2 + ∆N
pc;rn(∗|∗) +
∆N
NcM
2 + ∆N
1
2
. (20)
Equating, say pch0;rn(0|0) with p0;rd(0|0), and using (19), one obtains the expression for the maximum
safe distance:
Lmax =
10
α
[log10(2) + log10(1−
rd − rn
1− rd )]. (21)
Note that the expression (21) is defined only for (rd − rn)/(1 − rd) < 1. If rd ≥ (rn + 1)/2, there
exist no Lmax, i.e., a dishonest Alice can always fake her results successfully, which comes as no
surprise: for such high noise, rd > 1/2, the two commitments become indistinguishable and the
protocol is not viable. The above analysis is applicable to both two- and four-state protocols.
5 Multi-photon sources
There is still one detail that we have discarded up until now but that plagues any implementation
that may currently be done: the nonexistence of perfect single-photon sources. Indeed, up until
this point we have never considered the possibility that Alice may find with certainty in which state
certain particles are sent by Bob. It turns out, however, that any device used to prepare photons in
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a specific state has a non-negligible probability of creating a pair (or even triple, quadruple, etc.)
of photons in the same state instead. In a realistic scenario, one must consider a photon source
whose number of photons emitted per pulse follows a Poisson distribution with a certain parameter
µ (average number of photons per pulse), characteristic of the source. If we denote by P (n, µ) the
probability of obtaining n photons in a given pulse, we have
P (n, µ) =
µn
n!
e−µ. (22)
Alas, as soon as Bob sends more than one photon in a single pulse, which happens with prob-
ability (1 − e−µ − µe−µ), then Alice may split up the photons and measure the two observables,
Cˆ0 and Cˆ1, on two of them separately, thus learning the photon’s true state (provided Bob follows
the protocol) and producing statistics compatible with either a commitment to 0 or a commitment
to 1 upon request. If Alice receives only one photon, she reverts to the strategy described in Sec-
tion 3. We must then once again reevaluate the sets of cheating probabilities in order to obtain
pCH(i|j) - the probability that a cheating Alice, using every single tool at her disposal, will send
the value i back to Bob, every time he sends state |j〉. When trying to forge a commitment to 0,
the corresponding set of conditional probabilities for a two-state case is (the additional conditional
probabilities for a four-state case are obtained analogously)
pCH(0|0) = 1
1− e−µ [µe
−µpch(0|0) + (1− e−µ − µe−µ)p0(0|0)]
pCH(1|0) = 1
1− e−µ [µe
−µpch(1|0) + (1− e−µ − µe−µ)p0(1|0)]
pCH(0|+) = 1
1− e−µ [µe
−µpch(0|+) + (1− e−µ − µe−µ)p0(0|+)]
pCH(1|+) = 1
1− e−µ [µe
−µpch(1|+) + (1− e−µ − µe−µ)p0(1|+)],
(23)
and analogously for the case of a commitment to 1, by replacing p0(∗|∗) with p1(∗|∗).
In more detail, take for instance the very first value: pCH(0|0). This value has meaning only
if Bob actually sent something, which happens with probability (1− e−µ), hence the factor 1
1−e−µ .
Given the case, two mutually incompatible results may occur. Either Bob sends a single particle,
which happens with probability µe−µ, and Alice measures it using her single-photon strategy from
Section 3 [hence pch(0|0)], or Bob sends two or more particles, which happens with probability
(1 − e−µ − µe−µ), and Alice perfectly emulates the probability distribution of an honest party
[hence p0(0|0)]. All other expressions follow an analogous reasoning.
Note that that the conditional probabilities pch(∗|∗), corresponding to the strategy in Section 3,
are those which maximise the overall cheating probability pmaxch with respect to the case of the
multi-photon sources. Thus, the optimal values of p0→1 and p1→0 are, in general, different for the
strategies that maximise the cheating probability for the case of the single-photon source, and the
case of the multi-photon source. In Tables 1 and 2, we compare the mentioned optimal values for
both two- and four-state protocols, respectively, for M = 100, 200, 300 and 400, with r = 0.1 and,
for the multi-photon case, µ = 0.2 (the value used in the experimental realisation of a two-state
protocol [2]).
The cheating strategy considered here is beyond the capabilities of technology, both at present
and in any foreseeable future. To perform this kind of attack, a cheating Alice needs far more than
just a nondemolition measurement. She needs a device capable of detecting whether or not the
photon source emitted a single photon, and needs to change her measurement apparatus accordingly.
If a single photon was sent, she measures it using the optimal cheating observable. Otherwise, she
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M Single-photon Multi-photon
100 (0.0, 0.489663) (0.0, 0.492572)
200 (0.0, 0.490563) (0.0, 0.494314)
300 (0.0, 0.479936) (0.0, 0.483053)
400 (0.0, 0.47544) (0.0, 0.478355)
Table 1: The two-state protocol’s optimal values (p0→1, p1→0) for single-photon (left column) and
multi-photon (right column) sources, for M = 100, 200, 300 and 400, with r = 0.1 and, for the
multi-photon case, µ = 0.2.
M Single-photon Multi-photon
100 (0.0658591, 0.0658591) (0.0470355, 0.0470355)
200 (0.0793028, 0.0793028) (0.0592754, 0.0592754)
300 (0.0939039, 0.0939039) (0.0743531, 0.0743531)
400 (0.101166, 0.101166) (0.0818707, 0.0818707)
Table 2: The four-state protocol’s optimal values (p0→1, p1→0) for single-photon (left column) and
multi-photon (right column) sources, for M = 100, 200, 300 and 400, with r = 0.1 and, for the
multi-photon case, µ = 0.2.
splits two of the incoming photons into two different measurement apparatuses (measuring Cˆ0 and
Cˆ1 respectively). Such technology is far beyond our current capabilities. More realistic is to perform
the beam-splitter strategy for all of the pulses. This way, a cheating Alice would on average measure
Cˆ0 on half of the single-photon pulses (
1
2µe
−µNP ), and Cˆ1 on the other half, while for the rest of the
multiphoton pulses she will have the results of both the observables. Thus, for photons on which
the wrong observable was measured, a cheating Alice has to add random results. When committing
to 0, her statistics for a two-state case (the additional conditional probabilities for a four-state case
are obtained analogously) are given by
pBS(∗|∗) =
(
1− 1
2
µe−µ
1− e−µ
)
p0(∗|∗) +
(
1
2
µe−µ
1− e−µ
)
· 1
2
, (24)
and analogously for a commitment to 1, by replacing p0(∗|∗) with p1(∗|∗).
Naturally, the higher µ is, the closer the two distributions, given by (23) and (24), are to those
obtained by an honest Alice committing to 0 or committing to 1, respectively. Thus, we consider
only weak sources with a low average photon number µ ∈ {0, 1} (indeed, in a recent experimental
realisation of a two-state protocol [2], the value µ ≈ 0.2 was used). In Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9
are the plots of the probabilities of cheating for both types of strategies [less realistic, (23), and
more realistic, (24)], and both versions of the protocol (two- and four-state), as functions of the
average number of photons per pulse µ and the noise parameter r, for M = 100, 200, 300 and 400,
respectively.
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Figure 6: Probabilities of a cheating Alice with M = 100 successful measurements passing Bob’s
test of commitment to 0, as functions of the average number of photons per pulse µ ∈ {0, 1} and
the noise parameter r, for: the two-state protocol with the less realistic strategy (23) (top left);
the two-state protocol with the more realistic strategy (24) (bottom left); the four-state protocol
with the less realistic strategy (23) (top right); and the four-state protocol with the more realistic
strategy (24) (bottom right).
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Figure 7: Probabilities of a cheating Alice with M = 200 successful measurements passing Bob’s
test of commitment to 0, as functions of the average number of photons per pulse µ ∈ {0, 1} and
the noise parameter r, for: the two-state protocol with the less realistic strategy (23) (top left);
the two-state protocol with the more realistic strategy (24) (bottom left); the four-state protocol
with the less realistic strategy (23) (top right); and the four-state protocol with the more realistic
strategy (24) (bottom right).
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Figure 8: Probabilities of a cheating Alice with M = 300 successful measurements passing Bob’s
test of commitment to 0, as functions of the average number of photons per pulse µ ∈ {0, 1} and
the noise parameter r, for: the two-state protocol with the less realistic strategy (23) (top left);
the two-state protocol with the more realistic strategy (24) (bottom left); the four-state protocol
with the less realistic strategy (23) (top right); and the four-state protocol with the more realistic
strategy (24) (bottom right).
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Figure 9: Probabilities of a cheating Alice with M = 400 successful measurements passing Bob’s
test of commitment to 0, as functions of the average number of photons per pulse µ ∈ {0, 1} and
the noise parameter r, for: the two-state protocol with the less realistic strategy (23) (top left);
the two-state protocol with the more realistic strategy (24) (bottom left); the four-state protocol
with the less realistic strategy (23) (top right); and the four-state protocol with the more realistic
strategy (24) (bottom right).
6 Conclusions
We have analysed the cheating strategies for the practical two-state and four-state bit-commitment
protocols presented in [10] and [4], respectively. We showed that by introducing the “post-processing”
of the raw experimental data, one can improve the na¨ıve cheating strategy based on the measure-
ment in the Breidbart basis, originally studied in [10]. We have studied the two cases of perfect
single-photon and realistic multi-photon sources, showing that the “post-processing” optimal pa-
rameters p0→1 and p1→0 are in general different for the two cases. We have also analysed the
more realistic multi-photon source beam-splitter strategy which does not rely on (single-photon)
non-demolition measurements. In all of the mentioned cases, the four-state protocol shows a clear
advantage over the two-state version, with respect to the resources needed to achieve the same level
of security. Finally, we have analysed an alternative strategy, the faking-distance attack, based on
the forged geographical location of the committing party (Alice), showing that for today’s typical
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equipment the protocol is secure up to a distance of 15km between the parties, for both two- and
four-state protocols. Our approach is, following the analysis presented in [10], straightforward to
apply in the cases of noisy and/or bounded memories.
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